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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
TAXATION OF NONSTATUTORY STOCK OPTIONS - A
PROPOSED ANSWER TO A CONTINUING DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years stock options' have presented corporations with a
lucrative and opportune method of compensating highly paid key employees
and officers 2 and throughout this period the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the courts have sought to devise a fair and equitable method
of taxing these options.3 Part of the problem has been solved by sections
422 and 4234 of the Internal Revenue Code which grant favorable tax
treatment to those options which fall within their provisions. With respect
to those options not qualifying under the Code, generally called "non-
statutory stock options," 5 the difficulty6 in devising a taxing scheme centers
around the two-fold purpose of granting stock options. First, the option is
a means of compensating the highly paid employee with the advantage of
deferring the taxation of such compensation to a later and possibly more
advantageous time, while the corporation has the benefit of not having to
make a cash disbursement to such employee either at the time the services
are rendered or later when the option is exercised. Second, the stock
option acts as a stimulus to the employee by making him a potential
investor and proprietor of the corporation.
Because of this dichotomy in purpose, the taxing authorities and
courts are faced with the problem of pinpointing the time when the com-
pensatory aspect of the option subsides, and the investor-proprietary aspect
becomes the dominant factor. This transition can occur at any one of three
times in the life of an option. They are: (1) when the option has a readily
ascertainable market value;7 (2) when the option is exercised;8 and (3)
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(b) (1) (1959), defines an option as "the right orprivilege of a person to purchase property from any person by virtue of an offer
continuing for a stated period of time, whether or not irrevocable, to sell such property
at a stated price, such person being under no obligation to purchase."
2. Compare Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, in 2 COMPENDIUM O'
PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 1328 (1959) (submitted to Committee onWays and Means) with FORD, Stock Options Are in the Public Interest, HARV. BuS.
R.Ev., July-Aug., 1961, at 45.
3. See Lefevre, Nonrestricted Stock Options, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX
353 (1962) ; Spiegel, Development and Current Status of Nonstatutory Stock Options,
U. So. CAL. 1967 TAX INST. 217.
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 422, 423.
5. The tax treatment of nonstatutory stock options is provided for in Treas.
Reg. § 1.421-6, adopted by T.D. 6416, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 126 and amended by T.D.
6481, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 159; T.D. 6540, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 161; T.D. 6696, 1963-2CuM. BULL. 23; T.D. 6887, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 129 [hereinafter cited as Treas. Reg.
§ 1.421-61.
6. Obviously, this difficulty has arisen from the employee's desire to realize and
retain a maximum amount of dollars from his option which necessarily will depend
on the time when the gain arises and whether any gain accruing to him via the option
is taxed at ordinary income rates.
7. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (i), 33 Fed. Reg. 15,870 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6].
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1).
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when the option is sold.9 If restrictions are placed on the stock when the
option is exercised, the recognition of income by the employee will be
deferred until such restrictions lapse or the stock is sold in an arm's length
transaction. 10 The transition will have occurred, however, when the option
is exercised.
The determination of when the transition to investor occurs is relevant
for two reasons. First, such a decision will determine when and to what
extent the employee will realize and recognize ordinary income," and
second, it will determine when and to what extent the corporation may
deduct such compensation on its federal tax return. 12 In an attempt to
resolve this problem, the Commissioner has set forth criteria in his Regula-
tion and, more recently, in his proposed amendments to that Regulation.
This Regulation and the proposed amendments are, in essence, a mixture
of past cases and prior Regulations with an attempt to give new answers
to some of the perplexing problems which have arisen in the past. It is
the purpose of this Comment to analyze the Commissioner's Regulation
and proposed amendments as they relate to the transition of the option,
and to discuss briefly the deductibility to the corporation of the compensa-
tion recognized by the employee.
II. HISTORY
Initially, it was the Commissioner's position that "[w]here property
is sold . . . by an employer to an employee, for an amount substantially
less than its fair market value . . . such employee shall include in gross
income the difference between the amount paid for the property and the
amount of its fair market value."'u Thus, when an employee exercised
his option to purchase stock of the employer-corporation 14 he was treated
as having made a bargain-purchase resulting in the recognition of ordinary
income to the extent of the spread between the option price and fair
market value of the stock. The courts, however, formulated a test of
taxability which limited the scope of the Commissioner's Regulation solely
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(3).
10. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i).
11. Once the transition occurs, all gains or losses accruing to the employee from
the option or the stock acquired under the option will be considered capital gains.
However, when restrictions on the stock are employed such gains or losses may
thereby become ordinary. See pp. 316-17 infra. An unresolved question is whether
the employee will realize a capital loss if the transition occurs at the date of grant
of the option and the employee allows the option to terminate. It would appear that
since the option is not then "in the nature of compensation" (see pp. 305-08 infra),
that it would not be precluded from the treatment afforded by section 1234 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, allowing a capital loss in such situations. See pp.
305-08 infra.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.421--6(f).
13. T.D. 3435, I-1 Cum. BULL. 50 (1923).
14. Although Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (1) speaks of an option "to purchase stock
of the employer," it will also cover an option to purchase stock of a parent or sub-
sidiary or stock of another corporation under the "or other property" language of the
Regulation. For a discussion of the scope of this Regulation, see pp. 305-08 infra.
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to those options initially intended as compensation, thereby eliminating
those options which were, in the court's view, granted for the purpose of
creating a proprietary interest in the optionee.' 5 The Commissioner
acquiesced in these decisions 16 and amended his Regulation by limiting
the amount to be included in gross income at the time the option is exer-
cised "to the extent that such difference is in the nature of (1) compen-
sation for services rendered or to be rendered . .. .,7
This apparent agreement between the Commissioner and the courts
was, however, short-lived. In 1945 the Supreme Court held in Commis-
sioner v. Smith' s that the petitioner-optionee was to include in gross
income the spread between the option price and the fair market value of
the stock on the date the petitioner exercised his option. The important
aspect of this holding arose from the fact that the Court did not discuss
whether the option was intended to be compensation or to create a
proprietary interest in the employer-corporation. Rather, it based its
decision on the theory that "[s]ection 22(a) of the Revenue Act is broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit
conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode
by which it is effected."' 19 Because of this all-inclusive language, the
Commissioner concluded that the compensatory-proprietary intent test had
no continuing vitality. Accordingly, he issued T.D. 550720 and I.T. 3795,21
reverting to his initial position that all options involving the employment
relationship are compensatory and that the spread at the date of exercise
was to be included in gross income. In subsequent cases, however, the
courts were unwilling to follow the Commissioner's lead and to abandon
the compensatory-proprietary intent test, but rather continued to grant
favorable tax treatment to those options which were granted to the optionee
for the purpose of creating a proprietary interest in the corporation. 22
The Smith Court created another problem when it stated in dictum:
"It of course does not follow that in other circumstances not here present
the option itself, rather than the proceeds of its exercise, could not be
found to be the only intended compensation. '23 Arising from this after-
thought was the proposition that the option, rather than the stock under-
lying the option, was the intended form of compensation. Therefore, the
optionee may be required to include as compensatory income the value of
the option at the time of grant and not the gain at the time of any
subsequent exercise of the option. This exclusion from ordinary income
15. See Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
16. 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 13 (part 1).
17. T.D. 4879, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 159 (part 1).
18. 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
19. Id. at 181.
20. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18.
21. I.T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 15.
22. E.g., Malcolm S. Clark, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 719 (1950); Norman G.
Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949).
23. 324 U.S. at 182.
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of the spread at the time of exercise would be based on the theory that
the compensatory aspect of the option has been completed and taxed, and
that any gain he may realize from the subsequent exercise of the option
would flow from his status as an investor or owner of a capital asset.2 4
Prior to Smith, the only event considered to give rise to ordinary
income was the sale or exercise of the option by the optionee. As a result
of the Smith dictum, however, the granting of the option was added as
another date in the life of an option which may, under the proper circum-
stances, be considered as the appropriate date for the purposes of determin-
ing the amount of compensation the employee has realized from his option.2 5
In 1950, Congress attempted to eliminate the compensatory-proprie-
tary intent problem by creating a statutory exception to existing stock
option rules in the form of a "restricted stock option." An option which
met the new standards received favorable tax treatment because no gain
would be recognized by the employee until he sold the stock acquired
under the option and that gain would be taxed as a long term capital gain.20
The courts, however, ignored the possibility that this section preempted any
similar tax treatment to other options, and thus continued to exclude from
the operation of T.D. 5507 and I.T. 3795 those options which were granted
with the intention of creating a proprietary interest in the corporation.2 7
This practice continued until the Supreme Court's decision in Comnis-
sioner v. LoBue,28 where the Court stated:
[T]here is not a word in § 22(a) which indicates that its broad
coverage should be narrowed because of an employer's intention to
enlist more efficient service from his employees by making them part
proprietors of his business. In our view there is no statutory basis
for the [compensatory-proprietary intent] test established by the courts
below. When assets are transferred by an employer to an employee
to secure better services they are plainly compensation.
2 9
With the rejection of the compensatory-proprietary intent test, and the
recognition that all nonstatutory stock options granted to an employee were
to some extent compensatory, the only questions left for determination
24. See McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'g 19 T.C.
1001 (1953) ; Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 33 (3d
Cir. 1954).
25. See pp. 308-13 infra for a discussion of how the Regulation determines
whether the optionee realizes compensation income from the grant of the option and
the criteria used for such a determination.
26. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 130A, 64 Stat. 942 (now INT. REv. CODe of
1954, § 423). For a discussion of the rules pertaining to qualified options under the
1964 amendments to the INT. Rnv. CODE Of 1954, see Persons, What to Do About Key
Employee Stock Options Under the 1964 Revenue Act, 42 TAxns 351 (1964).
27. E.g., Commissioner v. Straus, 208 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'g 11 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 786 (1952) ; Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. 440 (1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 367
(3d Cir. 1955); Robert A. Bowen, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1954) ; James C.
Hazelton, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 398 (1953).
28. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
29. Id. at 247.
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were when and to what extent the employee realized ordinary income
in the form of compensation.30
After LoBue, one of three possible events during the life of an option
could be chosen as the time when the optionee-employee was compensated
by the optionor. 31 It could be at the time the option was granted, or when
the option was exercised, or when it was sold.3 2 However, in the situation
where the date of exercise was the time of compensation, the employee
may have been able to defer 33 or possibly even avoid3 4 recognition of any
ordinary income in the form of compensation by the placing of restrictions
on the stock acquired under the option.
This deferral or avoidance of ordinary income was made possible by
the cases of Robert Lehman3 5 and Harold H. Kuchman.3 6 Kuchman held
that the placing of certain restrictions on stock acquired under an option
would prevent the ascribing of any fair market value to the stock thereby
preventing any determination of the amount of ordinary income realized
by the optionee at the time of exercise. The Lehman case went further,
holding that the subsequent lapsing of those restrictions was not a taxable
event which would give rise to income and that when the stock acquired
under the option was sold, the taxpayer received no compensation but
only capital gain.
The Commissioner subsequently issued his nonacquiescence3 7 with
the Lehman decision and in 1959, in an attempt to clarify his position,
adopted Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 setting forth definite standards as to when
an option gives rise to compensatory income and what will be the amount
of that income. The Commissioner, in the process of conforming his
Regulation to the prior case law, retreated from his previous stand38 that
all compensatory options give rise to ordinary income at the time of
exercise. The Regulation and its proposed amendments now recognize
that, in addition to the date of exercise, other events such as (1) when the
option has a readily ascertainable fair market value,3 9 (2) when the
30. The following dictum in the LoBue case also added weight to the argument
that an employee may realize compensatory income on the date of grant:
It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to realize an immediate
taxable gain. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177,
181-182. The option might have a readily ascertainable market value and the re-
cipient might be free to sell his option. But this is not such a case.
Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
31. The option need not be given by the employer to give rise to compensation-
income nor must the employee be the optionee. See pp. 306-07 infra.
32. See pp. 308-16 infra.
33. Under Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i), the recognition of com-
pensation-income will occur only upon the lapsing of restrictions on the stock already
acquired under the option.
34. See pp. 316-17 infra for a discussion of this possibility under the decision of
the Tax Court in Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
35. 17 T.C. 652 (1951), acquiesced in, 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 3.
36. 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
37. The Commissioner withdrew his earlier acquiescence in the Lehman decision.
1962-2 Cum. BULL. 7, withdrawing acquiescence in, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
38. See T.D. 5507, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 18; I.T. 3795, 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 15.
39. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (i).
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option is sold, 40 or (3) when any existing restrictions lapse,41 may also
be points in the life of an option where the full measure of compensation
has been received by the employee. The question now is whether the
Commissioner's Regulation and his newly proposed amendments reflect the
prior case law and whether any discrepancies between the two are justified.
III. SCOPE OF THE REGULATION
All options falling within the scope of Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 will,
in accordance with its provisions, give rise to the realization of ordinary
income in the form of compensation at one time or another. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-15(a) provides for the recognition of such income by the following
language: "[A]n option in payment of an amount constituting compen-
sation of such person . . . is subject to the rules contained in § 1.421-6
for purposes of determining when income is realized in connection with
such option and the amount of such income."' 42 If the option does not
fall within the Regulation, then it would appear that the option would be
considered a capital asset and that the subsequent sale or exercise of the
option would be taxed in accordance with section 1234 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. 43
Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (1) uses the following language to define
the scope of its coverage: "If an employer or other person grants to
an employee or other person for any reason connected with the employ-
ment of such employee an option to purchase stock of the employer or
other property . . . then this section shall apply .... -44 Obviously, the
critical factor in determining whether an option4' falls within this definition
will be whether the person receiving the option would have received it
notwithstanding the employment relationship. 46 Where an employer grants
an option to an employee47 there would appear to be little room to argue
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(3).
41. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-15(a) (1963).
43. INT. Rpv. COD9 of 1954, § 1234.
44. Treas. Reg. 1.421-6(a) (1) (emphasis added). One might note that Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-15(b) (1), 29 Fed. Reg. 12,078 (1964), in contradistinction to
Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (1), defines the scope of coverage of Treas. Reg. § 1.61-15(a)
in a negative manner by excluding either:(i) An option which is subject to the rules contained in section 421 ; and(ii) An option which is not granted as the payment of an amount constituting
compensation, such as an option which is acquired solely as an invest-
ment, or as part of an investment unit described in paragraph (b) of§ 1.1232-3.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (1) purports to include options for the purchase of
any property which includes an option to purchase stock. This Comment, however,
is limited to the stock option although the principles considered in this analysis
would necessarily apply to options to purchase property other than stock.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (1).
47. The terms employee and employer are defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.421-
6(b) (3) (i) as: "The term 'employee' includes the person who provided the considera-
tion resulting in the grant of the option, the term 'employer' includes the person to
whom, or for whom, such consideration was provided, and the term 'employment' in-
cludes the providing of such consideration."
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that the option was not in some way "connected with the employment of
such employee."
The Regulation, however, covers other transactions in addition to
such direct grants from the employer to the employee, and the justification
for expanding the scope of the section can be found in several cases. For
example, in Wanda V. VanDusen,45 the Tax Court held that the optionee-
employee realized ordinary income upon the exercise of an option granted
to him by the shareholder-president of the corporation on the basis that
the option was granted as an inducement for the impending employment
relationship between the corporation and the optionee. In Robert C.
Enos,49 the Tax Court also refused to ignore the employment relationship
where an optionee-employee assigned the rights under his option contract
to his wife. Similarly, in Joseph Kane5" the Tax Court found that the
employment relationship was the critical factor in the granting of an option
even though neither the employer nor the employee was a party to the
option contract. The optionor was a major shareholder of the employer-
corporation and the optionee was the wife of the employee. The deciding
factor in the case was the provision in the option contract that the option's
existence was contingent upon the husband's continued employment with
the employer-corporation. 51
The Commissioner and the courts, in going beyond the direct em-
ployer-employee transaction, have established what amounts to a "but for"
test of taxability. In other words, if it is decided that but for the employ-
ment relationship the option would not have been granted, then the option
will be considered as a means of compensating the employee, thereby
bringing it within the provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6. It should be
kept in mind that the test of taxability is not based on whether the parties
intended the option as compensation to the employee,5 2 but it would appear
that intent would be relevant only where the optionee argues that the
option was intended as a gift, and not as compensation. Of course, where
there is some correllation between the employment relationship and the
granting of the option, the burden of proving that the option was intended
as a gift would be almost insurmountable.53
48. 8 T.C. 388 (1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948).
49. 31 T.C. 100 (1958).
50. 25 T.C. 1112 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 238 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
51. 25 T.C. at 1125.52. Intent becomes relevant when the issue is at what point during the option's
life did the employee realize compensation income. See pp. 312-13 infra for a dis-
cussion of this issue.
53. Indicative of this is the statement made by the Court in Commissioner v.
LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956):
The only exemption Congress provided from this very comprehensive definition
of taxable income that could possibly have application here is the gift exemption
of § 22(b) (3). But there was not the slightest indication of the kind of detached
and disinterested generosity which might evidence a "gift" in the statutory sense.
These transfers of stock bore none of the earmarks of a gift. They were made
by a company engaged in operating a business for profit, and the Tax Court
found that the stock option plan was designed to achieve more profitable operations
[VOL. 14
7
Riley: Taxation of Nonstatutory Stock Options - A Proposed Answer to a C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
WINTER 1969]
From a practical standpoint, the majority of options which are subject
to Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 are those in which the employer is the optionor
and the employee is the optionee and, for one reason or another, the option
fails to meet the tests necessary to qualify for favorable tax treatment
under sections 422 or 423 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.14 For
example, an option may not qualify under sections 422 or 423 where the
employer is not the optionor.5 5 The various other situations in which an
option may be subject to Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 are too numerous to set
forth. It is sufficient to state that Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6, by the use of such
broad language as "any person" or "any property," has effectively in-
cluded within its scope any option which in any way may be related to
the payment of compensation to someone in the employment relationship
and which does not qualify under sections 422 or 423.5"
Once it is determined that the option does fall within the scope of
Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6, the next question to confront the optionee is when
and to what extent income will be recognized under that Regulation.
As mentioned previously,57 the Commissioner has indicated in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.421-6 and the proposed amendments to that Regulation that several
possible events in the life of an option may give rise to the realization
of ordinary income, with recognition being deferred to a later time, or to
both the simultaneous realization and recognition of ordinary income.
They are: (1) the date when the option has a readily ascertainable fair
market value;58 (2) the date when the option is exercised; '59 (3) the date
when the option is sold;60 or (4) the date of the lapse of any existing
restrictions having a significant effect on the value of the stock."' It is
by providing the employees "with an incentive to promote the growth of the com-
pany by permitting them to participate in its success."
Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (1) states:
This section will apply, for example, when an option is not a qualified [section 422]
or restricted [section 423] stock option at the time it is granted or an option
granted or . . . when . . . an option is modified so that it no longer qualifies as
such an option, or when there is a disqualifying disposition of stock acquired by
the exercise of such an option so that section 421 does not apply.
55. Under section 422(b) of the Code only those options granted by the employer-
corporation or its parent or subsidiary corporation, to purchase stock of any such
corporations will qualify for favorable tax treatment.
56. But see pp. 315-16 infra. The operation of Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 is restricted
to those options granted on or after February 26, 1945 (the date of the Supreme
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945)). Treas. Reg.
1.421-6(a) (2). Also, Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a) (2) excludes:
(i) Property transferred pursuant to an option exercised before September
25, 1959, if the property is transferred subject to a restriction which has
a significant effect on its value, or
(ii) Property transferred pursuant to an option granted before September 25,
1959, and exercised on or after such date, if under the terms of the con-
tract granting such option, the property to be transferred upon exercise
of the option is to be subject to a restriction which has a significankeffect
on its value and if such property is actually transferred subject to such
restriction.
57. See pp. 300-01 supra.
58. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (i).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (3)
61. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i).
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quite clear, however, that the Commissioner is not ready to accept the
court's criteria for establishing which event will be used as the date when
the employee has been fully compensated and becomes an investor.
IV. RECEIPT OF THE OPTION AS THE
TRANSITIONAL EVENT
In Commissioner v. LoBue,62 the Supreme Court, in dictum, made
the following observation:
It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to realize
an immediate taxable gain. See Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177,
181-182. The option might have a readily ascertainable market value
and the recipient might be free to sell his option. 3
Obviously borrowing the language in LoBue, the Commissioner, in Treas.
Reg. § 1.421-6(c), established that an employee would realize and recog-
nize compensation at the time of grant if that option had a "readily
ascertainable fair market value."'64 The proposed amendment to Treas.
Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) now allows the employee to realize and recognize
ordinary income from the option at a time subsequent to its grant but
before it is exercised or sold by providing:
In the case of an option granted after October 26, 1968, which has
a readily ascertainable fair market value ...prior to its exercise or
transfer in an arm's length transaction, the employee includes com-
pensation in gross income only at the time the option first has a
readily ascertainable fair market value.65
According to the Regulation, an option will have a readily ascertainable
fair market value only when the "option is actively traded on an estab-
lished market"66 or, if the option is not traded on an established market,
when its market value "can be measured with reasonable accuracy."167
Whether an option's value can be measured with reasonable accuracy in
turn depends upon an affirmative showing that:
a) The option is freely transferrable by the optionee;
b) The option is exercisable immediately in full by the optionee;
c) The option or the property subject to the option is not subject
to any restriction or condition . .. which has a significant
effect upon the fair market value of the option or such prop-
erty; and
d) The fair market value of the option privilege is readily as-
certainable .... 68
62. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
63. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c).
65. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (i).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (2).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c)(3)(i).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i) (a), (b), (c), (d).
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Determining the existence of the first three conditions will normally be
possible after a brief review of the provisions of the option contract.
However, whether the privilege of acquiring property under the option60
has a readily ascertainable value will, according to the Regulation, necessi-
tate the consideration of the following factors:
a) Whether the value of the property subject to the option can
be ascertained;
b) The probability of any ascertainable value of such property
increasing or decreasing; and
c) The length of the period during which the option can be
exercised.7 0
Because of this multiple set of criteria, the practical effect of the Regula-
tion is to deny the realization of compensation to the optionee from the
receipt of the option unless the option is traded on an established market.
Whether the criteria established by the Regulation can be supported by
prior case law is certainly subject to question. 71
Estate of Lauson Stone72 and McNamara v. Commissioner73 were
the first two cases in which a court held that the granting of the option
was the intended means of compensating the employee, rather than its
subsequent sale or exercise. 74 In Stone, the optionee was issued 100 freely
negotiable warrant certificates, each of which represented a right to pur-
chase 100 shares of the employer-corporation, Follansbee Steel Corpora-
tion. The certificates were not exercisable until 6 months after the date
of grant. The purchase price for the stock was set at $21 per share by
the warrants, and the fair market value ascribed to the stock at the date
of grant was $19.75 per share.75 One year later, the petitioner sold 89
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (ii) defines option privilege as: "[T]he oppor-
tunity to benefit at any time during the period the option may be exercised from any
appreciation during such period in the value of the property subject to the option
without risking any capital."
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (ii) (a), (b), (c).
71. See also Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 GuM. BULL. 15, where the Commissioner
expressed a very definite desire of finding a fair market value except in extreme cir-
cumstances; Spiegel, Development and Current Status of Nonstatutory Stock Options,
U. So. CAL. 1967 TAX INST. 217, 227.
72. 19 T.C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954), nonacquiescence in,1953-1 CuM. BULL. 1. But see Union Chems. & Materials Corp. v. United States,296 F.2d 221 (Ct. Cl. 1961), where the court was faced with the question as to the
extent of the deduction allowed to the optionor and found that the option in the Stone
case had no readily ascertainable market value at the date of the grant.
73. 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'g 19 T.C. 1001 (1953). The Commissioner
acquiesced in the Tax Court opinion in 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
74. For a discussion of the Stone-McNamara cases, see Comment, Taxation of
the Stock Option as Intended Compensation, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 703 (1962).
75. Initially, it was believed that an upward spread between the option price and
market value was necessary in order for the option to have a readily ascertainable
market value at the date of grant. See Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181(1945), where the Court said: "When the option price is less than the market price
of the property for the purchase of which the option is given, it may have present
value and may be found to be itself compensation for services rendered." See alsoEstate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 878 (1953). Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c), however,
does not include such a requirement. See Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381, 384
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of the warrants for $82,680, reporting the transfer as a sale of a capital
asset resulting in a long term capital gain of $76,790. The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency on the basis that the gain on the sale of the warrants
was the intended mode of compensation to the optionee and therefore was
ordinary income. The Tax Court, in rejecting the Commissioner's posi-
tion, stated that:
[T]he [only] reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts pre-
sented is that the parties were dealing in stock warrants and not the
shares of stock that could be acquired thereunder. The following
facts lend support to such a view, i.e., the decedent paid a valuable
consideration for their issuance; the warrants were negotiable from
their date; they were protected against dilution in value; and they
were not contingent upon his continued employment. 70
Conspicuously absent from the facts considered critical in the eyes of the
court was that the warrants were not exercisable in full at the time of
grant,7 7 as required by Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i) (b). Therefore,
ascribing a compensatory value to an option at the date of grant may not
necessitate that the option be exercisable in full when received by the
optionee, despite such a requirement in the Regulation.
This position is corroborated by the seventh circuit's decision in
the McNamara case. In McNamara the petitioner was given a 2-year
unconditional, assignable option with semi-annual exercise dates. The
circuit court agreed with the Tax Court that the "intention of the parties
is the controlling factor in determining this question"7 8 of whether the
value of the option or the bargain-purchase of the stock underlying the
option was the amount of compensation involved. However, the circuit
court reversed the Tax Court's decision that the employee realized com-
pensation upon the exercise of the option because the circuit court found
that the parties intended that the option was to be the vehicle of com-
pensating the employee. Notwithstanding the fact that the options were
not immediately exercisable in full, the court found that the option had a
fair market value on the basis that the option was assignable and that
there existed a spread 79 between the option price and the market value
at the date of grant. These cases, however, did make it clear that the
options must be alienable to have a market value,t ° as is now required
by Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i) (a).
In addition to the two factors mentioned above, the Commissioner
has also included two other conditions before the value of the option can
be determined.8 ' Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i) (c) requires the option
(N.D. Ohio 1962), where the court, in dictum, criticized the rule that a spread must
exist at the date of grant between the option price and fair market value of the stock
in order for it to have a readily ascertainable market value.
76. Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 877 (1953).
77. The warrants were exercisable 6 months after the date of grant. Id. at 874.
78. McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1954).
79. See note 75 supra.
80. Commissioner v. LoBue. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
81. See pp. 308-09 supra.
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or the stock to be acquired under the option to be devoid of any conditions
or restrictions.8 2 This requirement would appear to be consistent with the
Kuchman-Lehman 3 decisions of the Tax Court which held that the im-
position of restrictions on stock acquired under an option prevented the
ascertainment of its fair market value at the date of acquisition. 84 How-
ever, the placing of "conditions" on the same plane with "restrictions"
with respect to the effect each has on the market value of the option85 is
an extension of the holdings in these two cases. The Tax Court, in holding
that restrictions on the sale of the stock acquired under the option pre-
vented the valuation of the stock, noted:
Since fair market value is defined as the price at which the property
to be valued with all its attributes would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller generally [citation omitted] and
not as the sale might be limited to one specific purchaser [citations
omitted] we have concluded that the ascertainment of fair market
value cannot be founded on this testimony [that a purchaser could
not be found for this stock under such contractual restrictions] .8
It is submitted that conditions on the exercise of the option which may be
fulfilled by the individual at any time do not necessarily prevent the
valuation of the option in the same manner as contractually agreed upon
restraints on alienation, as existed in the Kuchman-Lehman cases. There-
fore, it would seem that a very plausible argument could be made that
conditions, such as the one mentioned above, will not prevent valuation
of the option but will only reduce its value.87
The Commissioner's fourth requirement 88 in determining whether an
option's value can be measured with "reasonable accuracy" relates to
the value of the option privilege, more commonly referred to as the
"percentage lead." In Colton v. Williams,89 the court, in valuing the
option granted to an employee, expressly included the percentage lead
factor, using Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i) (d) as support for the
adoption of this factor as part of its valuation method.90 However, in
ascribing a value for percentage lead, the court did not use the three criteria
82. For a very good discussion of the differences between conditions and restric-
tions under Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6, see Bromberg, Opportunities Open up for Tax
Planning Under New Regulations on Non-statutory Stock Options, 12 J. TAXATION
297 (1960).
83. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952) ; Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
84. For a discussion of the results following the use of restrictions on stock
acquired under an option, see pp. 316-19 infra.
85. Notably, the lapsing of conditions on stock acquired under an option are
treated differently than the lapsing of restrictions. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.421-
6(d) (1) with Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i).
86. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154, 163 (1952).
87. The Tax Court until recently has held that investment letter stock does not
deprive the stock of a fair market value but merely reduces that value. The Tax Court
has also found a stock's value to be less than market if blockage principles are
in operation.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i) (d).
89. 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
90. Id. at 384.
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which Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (ii) established explicitly for that
purpose. Instead, the court based its decision on expert testimony, which
it regarded as the only "reliable means of proof.""' It would be pure
speculation to state that the expert considered the three factors delineated
in the Regulation.
Recently, the Tax Court has shown a definite inclination to use the
four standards of valuation set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (i). 2
Therefore, it would appear that all options now falling within the scope
of Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 will be required to satisfy these criteria, in order
for the option to have a readily ascertainable fair market value. It should
be noted, however, that the valuation structure established by the Regula-
tion conflicts with the Internal Revenue Service's general policy of valuing
property when received except under extremely unusual circumstances.93
Furthermore, the question here is not whether the employee realizes
compensatory income, but only what amount he receives, 94 because after
the LoBue decision it was recognized that all nonstatutory employment
stock options, at one time or another, give rise to ordinary income. There-
fore, there is no justification for the Commissioner's stringent criteria
except that of raising additional tax dollars. Moreover, more leniency in
this area would not appreciably diminish the revenue now forthcoming
because the amount of compensation generally expected by the parties is
the spread at the date of exercise and it is at that time that the employee
will normally consider himself as an investor and proprietor.9 5
Generally, there appears to be two logical approaches to the question
of whether the employee realizes and recognizes compensation before the
sale or exercise of an option. Under the Regulation and proposed amend-
ments to the Regulation, it would appear that the intent to compensate
the employee by means of the option itself is a question of fact, with the
critical question being whether the option has any fair market value at
some date prior to its sale or exercise. 96 That is, if an option has no fair
market value 97 at a date prior to its sale or exercise, then there could be
no intent to compensate the employee by means of the option, as nothing
of value has been given to the employee.
The second approach would be to determine first, as a question of
fact, whether the parties intended the option or the stock underlying the
91. Id. at 385.
92. E.g., Donald H. Kunsman, 49 T.C. 63 (1967); Jack I. LeVant, 45 T.C. 185(1965), rev'd, 376 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Willie L. McNatt, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 542 (1962), aff'd sub non., Frank v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1963).
But see Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
93. Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15.
94. Under the compensatory-proprietary intent test the optionee could completely
avoid the realization of compensatory income. See pp. 301-03 supra. After LoBue,
however, this is not possible. But see pp. 316-17 infra.
95. See Rhodes, Unrestricted Stock Options, 11 Sw. L.J. 39 (1957).
96. See generally Jack I. LeVant, 45 T.C. 185 (1965), rev'd, 376 F.2d 434 (7th
Cir. 1967); Graney v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. W.Va. 1966), aff'd
per curiam, 377 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1967).
97. See note 75 supra.
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option to be the mode of compensation. If the option was found to be the
intended method of compensating the employee then the next question
would be whether the option had an ascertainable value. Absent an ascer-
tainable value, the transaction would be treated as an "open transaction"
under the theory of Burnet v. Logan,98 and compensation would result
to the employee upon some subsequent event when the value could
be ascertained.
It is submitted that, contrary to the proposed amendments to Treas.
Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1) (i), the test for determining whether the employee
realizes income before the option is sold or exercised should be based on
the intent of the parties to the option. More specifically, the critical ques-
tion is whether the parties intended to compensate the employee by the
granting of the option or by the stock underlying the option. Therefore,
the stringent valuation requirements contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6
could be eliminated in favor of the general policy of valuation set forth in
Rev. Rul. 58-402.99 The point in time at which the parties intended the
compensation to occur should be a question of fact. The critical factors
in determining this intent should be the three criteria set forth in Treas.
Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (ii) (a), (b), and (c). 100 This method of deter-
mining the taxable event would appear to be more consistent with the
case law' 0 ' and would eliminate the existing conflict between the Regula-
tion and the general valuing policy previously established by the Com-
missioner. In addition, this position would not, to any large degree, affect
decisions which might be obtained under the proposed amendments to the
Regulation. Furthermore, by adopting this "open transaction" concept,
the Regulation would maintain an internally consistent position. 0 2
98. 283 U.S. 404 (1931); accord, Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.
1949). But see Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15.
99. 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15.
100. Whether the option is subject to conditions or restrictions or exercisable
immediately, or whether the parties expect the market value of the stock to appreciate
substantially during the term of the option would be the critical factors in determining
whether the optionor intended to presently compensate the employee. Restraints on
alienation would affect the determination of whether the option had a fair market
value. However, notations in the minutes of the corporation or within the option
itself that the optionor intends to currently compensate the employee should be given
little weight. But see McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954),
rev'g 19 T.C. 1001 (1953).
101. E.g., McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954); Estate of
Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872 (1953).
102. It should be apparent that the Regulation was inconsistent as to its approach
to the lapsing of restrictions or conditions. That is, that if restrictions or conditions
were placed on the option at the date of grant, the lapsing of those restrictions or
conditions will not result in the recognition of compensatory income. However, if the
conditions or restrictions were placed on the stock acquired under the option, he will
recognize ordinary income when they lapse. See Aidinoff, Employee and Non-
Employee Stock Options: Recent Developments, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FXD. TAX.
167, 182. However, this inconsistency bas been removed by the Proposed Regulation
in that if restrictions on the sale of an option lapse before the option is exercised it
may then be valued. See Commissioner v. Ogsbury, 258 F.2d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir.
1958), aff'g 28 T.C. 93 (1957), where such a result was indicated.
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V. THE SALE OR EXERCISE OF THE OPTION AS THE
TRANSITIONAL EVENT
If the transitional event is not the grant of the option, then it must
occur either when the option is sold 10 3 or when it is exercised.'0 4 Of
course, if the employee allows the option to lapse, no compensation will
be received by the employee, as he will have received nothing of value.
If the option is not sold but is exercised by the optionee, then the
employee will realize income at that time and to the extent of the differ-
ence between the option price and the fair market value of the stock on
the date of exercise. 10 5 However, in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.421-
6(d) (1), the optionee must, at the date of exercise, have "an uncon-
ditional right to receive the property subject to the option" or the determi-
nation of the amount to be included in gross income as compensation will
be deferred until such right exists.'0 6 "[C]onditions that may be per-
formed by him at any time,"'107 such as making payment for the stock
when he so desires, are excluded from those which may make the em-
ployee's right to receive the stock a conditional right. An example of
a conditional right to receive stock would be where the optionee is to
receive the stock only if and when it is received by the optionor.' 0 8
With respect to sales of options, Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (3) pro-
vides that if the option is "transferred in an arm's length transaction,
the employee realizes compensation in the amount of the gain resulting
from such transfer of the option .... .109 The recognition of compen-
satory income upon the sale of an option which is in the nature of
compensation is not a concept new to tax law. 110 The Technical Amend-
ments Act of 1958111 specifically amended section 1234 of the Code to
provide for the recognition of ordinary income upon the sale of a com-
pensatory stock option. Section 1234(d) now states:
This section [providing that gain or loss on the sale of an option shall
take the same character as any gain or loss on a sale of the property
underlying the option] shall not apply to-
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (3).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1).
105. Id.
106. See Philip J. LoBue, 28 T.C. 1317 (1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1958);
Estate of James S. Ogsbury, 28 T.C. 93 (1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958).
See also Graney v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. W.Va. 1966), aff'd per
curiarn, 377 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1967), where the taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that
the placing of the optioned stock in escrow with title in his name, such stock to be
transferred to him when he made payment, gave him the property interest at the date
of grant. Thus, it would appear that an unconditional right to the stock can never be
acquired prior to the exercise of the option.
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(1).
108. E.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); Estate of James S.
Ogsbury, 28 T.C. 93 (1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (3).
110. E.g., Charles E. Sorensen, 22 T.C. 321 (1954). But see Ben F. Read, 13
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 123 (1954).
111. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, ch. 1, § 53, 72 Stat. 1644 (1958).
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(2) in the case of gain attributable to the sale or exchange of a
privilege or option, any income derived in connection with such
privilege or option which, without regard to this section, is treated
as other than gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset ;112
Furthermore, the report of the Senate Committee on Finance" 3 clearly
indicates by the following language that this subsection was to apply to
the sale of an employee stock option: "As a result [of the addition of
subsection (d) (2)] the section [1234(a)] will not apply to gain from the
sale of an employee stock option which is in the nature of compensation
to the employee."" 4
Even prior to the amendment of section 1234, the Tax Court had
held that the sale of a compensatory stock option resulted in ordinary
income rather than capital gains.' 15 Cases rendered subsequent to the
amendment have also denied capital gains treatment, now on the basis
of section 1234(d) (2). Indicative of these latter cases is Rank v. United
States," 6 where the employee was the holder of a restricted stock option
under section 130A of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. The optionor-
corporation wished to liquidate under section 337, which required that the
liquidation be completed within 1 year from the date of the adoption of
the plan of liquidation. Because the outstanding options represented a
potential barrier to such complete liquidation, the corporation offered to
repurchase the options at a price of $11.25 per share. The optionee-
employee accepted the offer and the sale was consummated. The em-
ployees reported the gain as resulting from the sale of a capital asset. The
fifth circuit, however, took a different view of the transaction. The court
noted that if the options had been exercised by the optionees and the
stock held for the period required by statute, no compensation income
would result under section 130A of the 1939 Code. However, the court
decided that qualifying the option under section 130A did not mean that
the option was not compensatory; it merely meant that if all the require-
ments set forth in the section were complied with, no ordinary income
would result upon the exercise of the option. Because the sale of the
option was an act of disqualification, it was relegated to the position of a
nonstatutory compensatory stock option, and thus the sale clearly fell
within the language of section 1234(c) (2).117
In summation, it should be apparent that the sale of any stock option
which was granted because of the employment relationship will result in
the realization and recognition of ordinary income and that the statement
in Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (3) is merely a reiteration of what was
112. INT. ReV. CODE Of 1954, § 1234(d) (2).
113. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1958).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See note 110 supra.
116. 345 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Dugan v. United States, 237 F. Supp.
7 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Donald H. Kunsman, 49 T.C. 62 (1967).
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previously being done by the courts. It is also clear that, absent the intent
to compensate and the ability to value the option before its exercise,
the transition of an option can occur only when the option is sold or
exercised.' 18 Whether there is an intent to compensate at this later date
is irrelevant. If the economic or financial benefit received at the time of
exercise is incapable of valuation due to the imposition of conditions
beyond the employee's control, the transaction is left open solely for the
purposes of determining the value received by the employee and not
because he was not compensated at that time. However, whether a similar
result is reached when restrictions are placed on the stock acquired under
the option is not without question.
VI. RESTRICTED STOCK - Is THE LAPSE OF RESTRICTIONS
A TRANSITIONAL EVENT OR A POINT
OF VALUATION?
Initially, in Robert Lehman,1" 9 the Commissioner took the position
that no compensation income is realized when the optionee receives stock
subject to restrictions because of the then inability to ascertain a fair
market value; however, he reasoned that upon the lapsing of those restric-
tions, the employee realizes compensation to the extent of the spread on
the date of exercise. The Tax Court, however, took a different view, stating
that the "[t] ermination of the restrictions was not a taxable event such as
the receipt of compensation for services or the disposition of property."1 20
With this result in mind, the Commissioner, in the subsequent case of
Harold H. Kuchman,'2 ' argued that the optionee realized compensation
on the date he exercised the options notwithstanding certain contractual
restrictions on the sale of the stock acquired under the option. In rejecting
the Commissioner's position, the Tax Court said that "[u]nder these cir-
cumstances 122 acquisition of the stock does not justify charging petitioner
118. See Commissioner v. Ogsbury, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958). In Ogsbury,
the court posed the following hypothetical:
Thus, assuming that Ogsbury's employer in 1945 had removed the restriction on
assignability from Ogsbury's option, the economic benefit so conferred upon
Ogsbury by such an option would have been identical to the economic benefit con-
ferred upon him after he exercised his right under the within option as it was
amended in 1945. Clearly, in the assumed case, Ogsbury would have been in
receipt of income in 1945.
Id. at 296-97.
119. 17 T.C. 652 (1951), nonacquiescence in, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 7. See Note,
The Valuation of Option Stock Subject to Repurchase Options and Restraints on
Sale: A New Tax Bonanza in Executive Compensation, 62 YALt L.J. 832 (1953).
120. 17 T.C. at 654.
121. 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-I CuM. BULL. 3. See also MacDonald
v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'g 23 T.C. 227 (1954). Restrictions
preventing the ascertaining of fair market value were first recognized in Helvering
v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937).
122. In the Kuchnman case the contractual restrictions in question were: (1) that
the optionee would not, during the first year after he acquired stock under the option,
sell it without the written consent of the underwriter; (2) that if his employment
with the Bates Manufacturing Co. should terminate within 1 year from the date he
acquired the stock under the option, he would resell the stock to the underwriter for
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in the year of its receipt with income in any amount.' 2 3 As a result of
these two decisions, it would seem that, by the use of restrictions having
a significant effect on the stock's value, the employee can avoid the recog-
nition of any ordinary income at the time of exercise or when the restric-
tions lapse.
Apparently defeated on both fronts, the Commissioner, in his Regula-
tion, took the position that the optionee was to report as compensation
income the lesser of :124
a) The difference between the amount paid for the property and
the fair market value of the property (determined without
regard to the restriction) at the time of its acquisition, or
b) The difference between the amount paid for the property and
either its fair market value at the time the restriction lapses
or the consideration received upon the sale or exchange, which-
ever is applicable. 125
By allowing the optionee to use the lesser of these two figures, the Com-
missioner placed the optionee-employee in the advantageous position of
receiving capital gains treatment for any gain accruing to him during the
period the restrictions are in force,'1 2 6 whereas any losses would be, in
effect, treated as ordinary. This is a result which is not supported by
the prior cases.
The initial error made by the Commissioner was his position in
Lehman that the lapsing of restrictions was a taxable event resulting in
compensation to the optionee-employee. It is submitted that the correct
position to be taken by the Commissioner in regard to the lapsing of the
restrictions is that taken in the proposed amendments, namely, that the
lapsing of restrictions is not a taxable event, but rather that it is the
closing or finalizing of an "open transaction" within the rationale of
Burnet v. Logan.127 In other words, the only possible event 128 when
the option price; and (3) that if he wished to sell the stock during the first 2 years
after acquisition he would first offer it to the underwriter at the current bid price.
18 T.C. at 158-59.
123. Id. at 163.
124. Under Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (iii) all options granted before
October 26, 1968, and exercised by the person to whom it was granted will be subject
to the same rules as those in Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i). However, T.I.R. 1006,
7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6426, at 71,127, extended this period until June
30, 1969.
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i) (a) (b). If a sale or exchange is consum-
mated before the restrictions lapse and is not at arm's length, then the employee is
to recognize ordinary income in the year of sale to the extent of the gain. In addition,
he shall include the difference between such gain recognized and that accruing on the
date the restrictions lapse or the stock is sold at arm's length. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-
6(d) (2) (i).
126. Of course, if the stock is sold in an arm's length transaction before the
restrictions lapse, he will realize and recognize compensatory income at that time.
Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i).
127. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
128. An argument may, however, be made that since restrictions having a
significant effect on the market value of the stock are, in effect, limited to those which
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the transition to investor could occur is when the option is exercised,
since it is at this time that the optionee is irrevocably committed to a
position as holder of a capital asset and, in such a position, is subject to
all the attributes of an investor. 129 All market fluctuations will affect the
value of the stock he has received and he will receive all dividends and
exercise any voting privilege the stock may possess. However, once the
parties place restrictions on the stock acquired under the option in order to
defer the valuation of the financial or economic benefit received to a later
date,130 then any gain and loss in the stock occurring during this period,
which is normally characterized as capital, will be effectively converted to
an ordinary gain or loss as a result of the parties' own agreement. 13
1
Therefore, the spread at the date the restrictions lapse should be the amount
of compensation income regardless of whether the market for the stock in-
creased or decreased during the period when the restrictions were in force.
The Tax Court, in subsequent cases, has limited the effect of the
Kuchman-Lehman decisions by limiting restrictions held to have a signifi-
cant effect on the value of the stock essentially to those which place an
absolute restriction on the sale of the stock."32 The court has recently
indicated a retreat from this position as to investment letter stock which
had been held to be capable of valuation even though the value would be
reduced below market to reflect a discount due to the limited number of
potential buyers available."'3 In light of the restricted application of the
prevent the sale of the stock, Harry Simmons, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1423 (1964)
and cases cited in note 132 infra, that the lapsing of the restrictions results in the
receipt of the intangible right of alienation within the concept of United States v.
Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), and that such is a taxable event.
129. See Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, 51 Ky. L.J. 246 (1963), where
it is stated:
Of course, once the employee exercises his option, he does have capital at risk,
assuming he has made bona fide payment. Any fluctuation from the fair market
value at the time he acquires the stock is a true capital gain or loss, and should be
treated accordingly.
Id. at 252.
130. It is possible to minimize the total tax on the ordinary income realized from
the exercise of the option by placing restrictions on the stock and lapsing those restric-
tions over a period of years.
131. It has been posited that restrictions will not be given operative effect unless
there existed a valid business purpose for the use of such restrictions. See Kempler,
Non-Restricted Stock Option Plans: Kuchman and Lehman Cases, 16 TAx L. Rgv.
339 (1961).
132. E.g., Jack I. LeVant, 45 T.C. 185 (1965), aff'd, 376 F.2d 434 (7th Cir.
1967); W.H. Weaver, 25 T.C. 1067 (1956) ; Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 Cums. BULL. 184.
In Harry Simmons, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1423 (1964), the court said:
Where there is an absolute restriction on transfer, it has been held that no
ascertainable value can be found .... Since it appears from the record before us
that at least private sale is possible, we believe an ascertainable fair market value
can be found and, therefore, the petitioners realized income from the bargain
purchase of Imperial stock in 1958.
Id. at 1426.
133. In the case of Max D. Klahr, 1968-245 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 7703(m), the
Tax Court held that an investment letter did sufficiently restrict the stock to have a
significant effect on its value. But see Victorson v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 264(2d Cir. 1964), aff'g 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1238 (1962); William H. Husted, 47
T.C. 664 (1967). See also cases cited in note 132 supra.
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Kuchman-Lehman cases by the Tax Court, it would appear that a direct
attack upon their cumulative holdings would meet with some success. 13 4
Of course, the position could be taken that the amount of compensa-
tion realized is the spread on the date of exercise which, due to the im-
position of restrictions on the stock, could not be recognized until the
restrictions lapse or the stock is sold in an arm's length transaction. This
position would, however, conflict with the general valuation policies of
the Service that if value can be ascertained, income is then realized and
recognizable. Such a conflict should be avoided. In any event, an employee
should not be allowed to avoid completely the recognition of ordinary
income by the use of restrictions on the stock acquired under the option.
VII. DEDUCTIBILITY OF COMPENSATION
Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(f) allows the employer to deduct, as com-
pensation paid to an employee, the amount of income realized and
recognized by the employee under subsections (c) and (d). 135 Because
the language of the Regulation refers only to the situation in which the
employer granted the option, it could be maintained that if someone such
as a shareholder or a subsidiary granted the option, a deduction by the
employer would not be allowed. 136 On the other hand, a deduction is
not expressly denied to the employer in such a situation.33 In Deputy
v. du Pont,'3s the taxpayer, a major stockholder of du Pont, attempted to
deduct the cost of transferring 9000 shares of his personal holdings of
du Pont stock to key executive employees on the theory that it was an
ordinary and necessary expense of his trade or business. The Supreme
Court denied the deduction to the taxpayer on the basis that the deduction
did not "proximately result . . . from the taxpayer's business but from the
business of the du Pont company.' ' '3 9  More recently, in Walton 0.
Hewett,140 the Tax Court denied the petitioner-sole shareholder a deduction
he attempted to take under either section 212 or 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 for the cost of stock transferred from his personal holdings
to two salesmen in payment of commissions. The basis of the denial was
134. E.g., Kempler, supra note 131, at 339.
135. E.g., Union Chems. & Materials Corp. v. United States, 296 F.2d 221 (Ct. Cl.
1961) ; see Lefevre, Non-Restricted Stock Option, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
353, 368 (1962).
136. The Commissioner has, under Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a) (12), attempted to
disallow to the employer a deduction for payments made for the benefit of a non-
qualified employee's trust. But see Buttery Stores, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d
799 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ; Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. United States, 314 F.2d 953(Ct. Cl. 1963) ; Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
137. If the income realized by the employee is deductible as compensation, then
the employer may have very definite problems complying with the withholding of
taxes under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3401. See Lefevre, supra note 135, at 369.
138. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
139. Id. at 494.
140. 47 T.C. 483 (1967). See also Bert B. Rand, 35 T.C. 956 (1961) ; Harry
Kahn, 26 T.C. 273 (1956).
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that the payments were not an "ordinary" expense for the conservation or
enhancing of the value of the petitioner's property, but instead were an
ordinary expense proximately related to the corporation's business.
If the transferring stockholder cannot take a deduction for the transfer,
then the question necessarily arises as to how the transaction is to be treated.
In J. K. Downer,141 the Tax Court answered this question when it held
that a transfer of stock from a major stockholder to an employee was a
taxable event in that it was a transfer of a capital asset which necessarily
resulted in a capital gain or loss to the transferring stockholder. The
"measure of such [gain or] loss is the difference between [the transferring
stockholder's] adjusted basis in the shares and their fair market value at the
time of transfer.' 42 The court distinguished the situation in which a stock-
holder transfers cash to the employee as compensation, noting that this
would be considered a contribution to the capital of the corporation.143 The
court based its distinction between the transfer of cash and the transfer of
shares to an employee on the fact that "[i]n the former case, there is no
change in his proportionate shareholder interest in the corporation - only
his investment has been varied. In the latter case, such a change admittedly
takes place.' 44 Thus, when "a shareholder . . . sells [or transfers] a
portion of his shares [he] realizes taxable gain or loss measured by the
difference between amount received and his cost basis in those shares even
though dollarwise the transaction does not recoup his total investment.' 45
Having established that the taxpayer in Downer incurred a loss on the
transfer, the next question confronting the court was whether the loss was
an ordinary or capital loss. The court held that the transfer resulted in a
capital loss on the basis that a "sale or exchange" of a capital asset had
occurred in that the stockholder had received, in return for the stock
transferred, an intangible benefit within the rationale of United States v.
Davis,146 namely, the continued rendering of services by the recipient to
the corporation.
With it now clear that the transferring stockholder cannot take a
deduction for the amount of compensation realized by the employee and
that the transfer of stock by the stockholder is a sale or exchange of a
capital asset, the question becomes whether the corporation can take a
deduction for the compensation paid. There is little authority to the effect
141. 48 T.C. 86 (1967). For a discussion of this question of proportionate versus
disproportionate payment by a stockholder to an employee, see O'Brien, Stock
Transfers by Shareholders to Outsiders for Nontangible Consideration, 39 TAXES
675 (1961).
142. 48 T.C. at 94.
143. But see Lefevre, supra note 135, at 369.
144. 48 T.C. at 91.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). In Davis, the Court held that the transfer of stock as
a result of a divorce settlement was a sale of a capital asset, the transferor receiving
the intangible marital right of the wife. That right was valued at the current fair
market value of the stock transferred to her. See also United States v. General Shoe
Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
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that the corporation can deduct an amount paid by another to the employee
as compensation. However, under the rationale of Deputy v. du Pont, it is
clear that such payments are ordinary expenses for the corporation's trade
or business and, under section 162(a) (2),147 any ordinary and necessary
expenses of the business of a corporation are deductible. In Heymann
Mercantile Co.,148 the Tax Court granted a corporation a deduction for
compensation paid to its president by a related partnership stating: "Since
it was paid for services rendered to the petitioner [corporation], was
reasonable in amount, and would have been a necessary expense of peti-
tioner ... we think it should be allowed as a deduction.' 49 This case can
be distinguished on the basis that the payment involved was made in cash,
not stock. More specifically, because the payment was made in cash, the
partnership would have been considered to have made a contribution to
capital and not to have entered into a taxable exchange of a capital asset
as occurred in Downer where stock was transferred. This distinction,
however, can be questioned on the basis that, even though a recognizable
exchange of stock has occurred in the Downer situation, the recognizable
amount to the stockholder is not necessarily a loss to the extent of the
compensation recognized by the employee as provided under the Regulation.
The loss may be greater or less than the amount of compensation realized
and recognized by the employee. In fact, the amount realized and recognized
by the stockholder may be a capital gain. Furthermore, as the gain or loss
to the stockholder is capital in nature, it will necessarily result in different
tax consequences than if it were ordinary income or ordinary loss. There-
fore, it would appear that, unless the corporation is allowed the deduction,
it would be lost. 150
It is submitted that such a result is not justified because, if the employee
receives ordinary income as compensation, the corporation should be allowed
a deduction as a necessary counterpart to the disallowance of a deduction
to the corporation when there is no ordinary income because the option
is qualified. 151 Thus, the corporation should be allowed a deduction in the
same amount as is realized and recognized as compensation by the employee.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to maintain consistency both with the case law and within
the Regulation itself, it is submitted that the Regulation delineating the
procedure for taxing nonstatutory stock options should comport with the
following analysis. First, the question should be whether the option, at
the date of grant, was intended to be the vehicle of compensating the
147. INT. ReV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a) (2).
148. 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1948).
149. Id. at 869.
150. See generally Royal Oaks Apartments, Inc., 43 T.C. 243 (1964); R.O.H.
Hill, Inc., 9 T.C. 153 (1947).
151. INT. RV. CODS of 1954, § 422.
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employee. In order to answer this question, the critical factors should be
those currently used to determine whether the option has a readily ascer-
tainable fair market value. If the option was not found to be the intended
vehicle of compensating the employee, then the stock underlying the option
necessarily must be the compensatory aspect of the option. Therefore,
when the option is exercised the employee will, at that time, have been
compensated by the employer. If the value of the compensation to the
employee cannot be ascertained in either case, then the transaction should
be kept open until such time as the value can be ascertained under general
valuation policies established by the Commissioner. Once it is determined
when and to what extent the employee is compensated, then the employer
should be allowed a deduction under section 162 to the extent of the com-
pensation recognized by the employee regardless of who is the optionor.
This approach would be a necessary corrollary to the position that the
employee will realize compensatory income from any option granted as a
result of his employment regardless of who is the optionor. It is submitted
that this process of analysis will be more consistent with the optionee's
transition to the status of investor and will not, to any large degree, change
results which may be obtained under the current Regulation and proposed
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